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The issue of whether government capital is productive has received a great deal of
attention recently, yet empirical analyses of public capital productivity have gener-
ally been limited to the official capital stock estimates available in a small sample
of countries. Alternatively, many researchers have investigated the output effects
of public investment—recognizing that investment may be a poor proxy for the cor-
responding capital stock. This paper attempts to overcome the data shortage by
providing internationally comparable capital stock estimates for 22 Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. [JEL C82, E22,
E62, H54]
T
he issue of whether government capital is productive has received a great deal of
recent attention. In his seminal contributions, Aschauer (1989a, 1989b) found
large positive output effects of government capital in the United States. His results
suggested that government capital was even more productive than private capital.
However, the large body of empirical literature that developed after Aschauer’s
early studies challenged these results. This literature—surveyed, for example, in
Gramlich (1994); Sturm, Kuper, and de Haan (1998); and Seitz (2001)—concludes
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that although there is evidence for positive output effects of government capital, the
magnitude of these effects is generally much smaller than Aschauer reported.
The lack of public capital stock data for a large number of Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries has forced
most empirical studies to focus on the United States. Few studies have investigated
the productivity of government capital for other OECD countries; examples are
Ford and Poret (1991) and Evans and Karras (1994). Both studies drew their data
from OECD (1997), which included capital stock series (provided by national
authorities) for 12 countries over the period 1970–96. However, the OECD data
were not internationally comparable, because estimation methods differed widely
across countries.1 This was one of the reasons the OECD suspended publication
of the capital stock series after 1997 and cofounded the Canberra Group on Capital
Stock Statistics, whose activities resulted in the publication of a manual on the mea-
surement of capital (OECD, 2001). Thus far, only a few countries have adjusted
their estimation methods, so internationally comparable capital stock data are still
not available.
In spite of these constraints, the analysis of public capital productivity has con-
tinued to be an active area of research. Most recent studies use an approach based
on vector autoregressive (VAR) models—for example, Mittnik and Neumann
(2001), Voss (2002), and Kamps (2005)—that, unlike the earlier production function
and cost function approaches, does not impose causal links among the variables
under investigation. The main disadvantage of this approach is that it generally
requires large data samples for conventional lag lengths. For this reason, most
researchers employing the VAR approach have used data on public investment
instead of data on the public capital stock. This choice has been dictated by the
lack of capital stock data for a large number of countries and the fact that public
investment data are usually available each quarter, whereas public capital stock
data are available only once a year. One drawback of this choice is the implicit
assumption that the effects of public investment are independent of the level of the
corresponding capital stock. Economic theory suggests that this assumption is
dubious. According to the law of diminishing returns, an increment to the public
capital stock (that is, public investment corrected for fixed capital consumption)
would have a small (large) output effect if the capital stock in the previous period
were large (small). There is indeed evidence for a fast decline in the marginal pro-
ductivity of public capital (Demetriades and Mamuneas, 2000, p. 702).
This paper provides internationally comparable annual capital stock estimates
for 22 OECD countries for the period 1960–2001, calculated using the perpetual
inventory method based on a geometric depreciation pattern. Capital stock data are
estimated for three categories of investment: (1) private nonresidential gross fixed
capital formation, (2) private residential gross fixed capital formation, and (3) gov-
ernment gross fixed capital formation. A sensitivity analysis explores the robust-
1Sturm, Kuper, and de Haan (1998, p. 382) draw attention to the problem that “most authors employ
data in their analysis which are generally chosen on the ground of their availability, without analyzing
whether their conclusions are sensitive not only to the concept of the public capital stock (narrow versus
broad definition), but also to the way the capital stock has been constructed.”Christophe Kamps
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ness of the capital stock estimates by varying the main estimation assumptions for
a reference country, the United States, for which public capital stock estimates
from official sources are available. The results of this sensitivity analysis suggest
that the benchmark capital stock estimates are robust. Finally, the paper reports
and compares estimation results for the production function approach, using three
alternative measures of the public capital stock: (1) the author’s estimates, (2) esti-
mates from national authorities, and (3) estimates from OECD (1997). The regres-
sion results confirm previous results in the literature based on the production
function approach and show that the elasticity of output with respect to public
capital is positive and statistically significant, but quite large for most countries.
According to estimates based on a simple panel data model, the elasticity of output
with respect to public capital is, on average, 0.2 in OECD countries.
I. Data
The basic ingredient for the estimation of capital stocks is historical data on gross
investment. These data are taken from the June 2002 version of the OECD
Analytical Database.2 The estimation is carried out for the following 22 OECD
countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.3 The series retrieved from this database expressed in constant prices
and in national currencies are (OECD code in parentheses) total gross fixed capi-
tal formation (ITV), total private gross fixed capital formation (IPV), private non-
residential gross fixed capital formation (IBV), private residential gross fixed
capital formation (IHV), and government gross fixed capital formation (IGV).
This paper uses public investment data from the OECD Analytical Database
because, in addition to providing long time series for a large panel of countries, the
data are categorized by institutional sector and are more comparable internationally
than data from national sources. Table 1 gives details about the institutional cover-
age of the public investment series. This information is important because the def-
inition of the public sector underlying the investment series varies not only across
sources for a given country but also across countries for a given source. Three def-
initions regarding the coverage of public investment are used by the countries
under investigation:4 (1) public investment of the general government; (2) public
2This database includes not only investment data but also a large set of other macroeconomic vari-
ables. In addition to investment, real gross domestic product (GDPV) and employment (ET) are retrieved.
Most of these data are available via the Internet at: www.sourceoecd.org.
3For most of these countries, the data are available for the period 1960–2001. The following OECD
countries are not included in the analysis because long investment series are not available: the Czech
Republic, Hungary, the Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Turkey.
4In OECD (1997), public entities are referred to as “producers of government services.” This category,
in most cases, corresponds to the definition of public activities underlying the investment series from
national sources. An important difference, however, is that capital stocks in OECD (1997) were based on
classifications of public activities according to the 1968 System of National Accounts, whereas recent
national data are based on classifications according to the 1993 System of National Accounts.NEW ESTIMATES OF GOVERNMENT NET CAPITAL STOCKS
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Table 1. Coverage of Government Gross Fixed Capital Formation
Country OECD ADB National Data OECD FSFC
Australia General government General government PGS4
Austria General government General government —
Belgium General government Public administration1 PGS4
Canada General government Public administration2 PGS4
Denmark General government General government PGS4
Finland General government General government PGS4
France General government — —
Germany General government General government PGS4
Greece General government — General government
Iceland General government — —
Ireland General government — —
Italy General government Public administration1 PGS4
Japan Public sector General government —
Netherlands General government — —
New Zealand Public sector Public sector —
Norway General government General government PGS4
Portugal General government — —
Spain General government Public administration3 —
Sweden General government — PGS4
Switzerland General government — —
United Kingdom General government General government PGS4
United States Public sector Public sector —
Sources: OECD ADB = OECD Analytical Database, which provides the investment series used in
the calculation of the author’s capital stock estimates. National data = government capital stock data
available from national authorities (see Kamps, 2004, Appendix I for details). OECD FSFC = OECD
(1997) publication Flows and Stocks of Fixed Capital 1970–1996.
Notes: The general government sector comprises the central, local, and state government sub-
sectors, including social security funds. The public sector comprises the general government and
nonfinancial public corporations. See IMF (2001) for details.
1Public administration and defense services, compulsory social security services (ISIC (International
Standard Industrial Classification) category).
2Public administration, educational services, and health care and social assistance (ISIC category).
3Public administration, educational services, and health care and social assistance provided by
the government (no private provision included) plus investment in infrastructure provided by public
corporations.
4Producers of government services (PGS). The coverage of PGS is somewhat smaller than that of
the general government, since the latter also includes departmental enterprises (Florio, 2001, p. 185).
Moreover, capital stocks in OECD (1997) were based on classifications of government activities accord-
ing to the 1968 System of National Accounts, whereas recent national data are based on classifications
according to the 1993 System of National Accounts.
investment of the nonfinancial public sector (general government plus nonfinancial
public enterprises (NFPEs)); and (3) investment carried out by economic units
engaged in activities labeled “Public administration and defense services, com-
pulsory social security services” (narrow definition) and “Public administration,
educational services, and health care and social assistance” (broad definition)
according to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). WhereasChristophe Kamps
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the first two definitions categorize by institutional sector, the latter two categorize
by type of economic activity. The ISIC category “Public administration, educa-
tional services, and health care and social assistance” comes close to the definition
of the nonfinancial public sector, but it also includes private spending on educa-
tion, which may be important in some countries, such as Canada.
Figure 1 displays the evolution of the public investment–GDP ratio for the 
22 countries over the period 1960–2001. The subpanels of Figure 1 for the indi-
vidual countries show the public investment–GDP ratio for the data from the OECD
Analytical Database as well as (if available) for data from national sources5 and
from OECD (1997). The public investment–GDP ratio has, in general, declined
over the sample period. In some countries, such as Austria and Ireland, the decline
has been particularly pronounced. Notable exceptions to the general pattern are
Greece, Portugal, and Spain, where public investment–GDP ratios have increased
considerably since their accession to the European Community in the 1980s. A
comparison of data from the three sources reveals that the ratios calculated for data
from the OECD Analytical Database match the ratios calculated with data from
national sources except for Belgium, Canada, Italy, Japan, and Spain. The differ-
ences between data from the Analytical Database and national sources and data
from OECD (1997) are quite large in most cases, partly reflecting the fact that
OECD (1997) data are based on the 1968 System of National Accounts, while the
other two sources rely on the 1993 System of National Accounts.6 To a certain
extent, the difference is also due to data revisions since the publication of OECD
(1997). However, the most important reason for the data discrepancy seems to be
different coverage of public investment.
II. Methodology
The methodology applied here in the estimation of capital stock data draws in
large part on OECD (2001) and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (1999).
The estimation exercise is comparable to that performed by Jacob, Sharma, and
Grabowski (1997), who estimate capital stocks by industrial activity according to
the ISIC. Here, however, the aim is to obtain estimates by institutional sector—
with a special focus on the public sector—rather than by industrial activity. Other
precursors of the present study include Berndt and Hansson (1991), who estimate
the public capital stock for Sweden; Sturm and de Haan (1995), who estimate the
public capital stock for the Netherlands; as well as Boskin, Robinson, and Huber
(1987); Munnell (1990); and Holtz-Eakin (1993), who estimate the capital stock
for local and state governments in the United States. This paper employs the same
estimation approach as those studies: the perpetual inventory method. The net
capital stock is estimated for the three subcategories of gross investment available
from the OECD Analytical Database: (1) private nonresidential gross fixed capital
5See Kamps (2004, Appendix I) for a description of data from national sources.
6For details of the 1993 System of National Accounts, see European Commission and others (1993).NEW ESTIMATES OF GOVERNMENT NET CAPITAL STOCKS
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Figure 1. Real Government Gross Fixed Capital Formation in 22 OECD
Countries, 1960–2001
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Sources: Series labeled “OECD ADB” are taken from the OECD Analytical Database, Version
June 2002. Series labeled “National source” are estimates from national authorities. Series labeled
“OECD FSFC” are calculated as follows: The gross investment series are taken from OECD
(1997) and divided by GDP series taken from OECD (1998). NEW ESTIMATES OF GOVERNMENT NET CAPITAL STOCKS
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formation, (2) private residential gross fixed capital formation, and (3) government
gross fixed capital formation.7
The basic idea of the perpetual inventory method is that the net capital stock
at the beginning of the following period, Kt+1, can be expressed as a function of
the net capital stock at the beginning of the current period, Kt, of gross investment
in the current period, It, and of depreciation8 in the current period, Dt:
If one further assumes geometric depreciation (that is, the capital stock depreciates
at a constant rate, δ), then the capital accumulation equation can be rewritten as
The method is called “perpetual” because all assets are forever part of the inven-
tory of capital stocks. Of course, the quantity of services provided by an asset
declines as it ages, but it never reaches zero. This can be seen by repeatedly sub-
stituting equation (2) for the capital stock at the beginning of period t:
This expression shows that the capital stock at the beginning of period t + 1 is a
weighted sum of past investment where the weights are a decreasing function of
the distance between the current period and the investment period. In practice, an
infinite number of past investment flows is not available, so equation (3) is
replaced by the following expression:
where K1 is the initial capital stock at the beginning of period 1.
According to equation (4), the application of the perpetual inventory method
requires the following inputs. First, a time series on gross investment flows is
needed. The estimations in this paper rely on investment data from the OECD
Analytical Database. Second, the estimations necessitate an initial capital stock; in









=− () +− () ∑ 11
0
1








=− () ∑ 1
0
13 δ .( )
KK I tt t + =− () + 1 12 δ .( )
KK I D tt t t + =+ − 1 1 .( )
7All series are expressed in the constant prices of 1995. For countries with a different base year
(Australia 1999/2000; Canada, 1997; Iceland, 1990; Norway, 1997; Switzerland, 1990; and the United
States, 1996), the series were rebased to 1995.
8The terms “depreciation” and “consumption of fixed capital” are used interchangeably in this paper.
This is common in economic literature. Note, however, that “depreciation” as used here differs consider-
ably from its use in company accounts, where it is calculated on the basis of historic costs rather than
market prices.Christophe Kamps
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made of the size and the time profile of the depreciation. Finally, a depreciation
method must be chosen. This study relies on geometric depreciation.
There is no official information on the magnitude of the initial capital stock
for any country except the United States. This paper follows an approach similar
to that used by Jacob, Sharma, and Grabowski (1997, p. 567) to estimate the ini-
tial capital stock. For that purpose, an artificial investment series for the period
1860–1959 is constructed for each country by assuming that investment increased
by 4 percent a year during this period, finally reaching its observed level in 1960.9
The rationale for this assumption is that total gross investment in the 22 OECD
countries under consideration grew by 4 percent a year on average during the period
1960–2001. It is, of course, highly improbable that investment in the earlier period
grew at the same rate or that investment growth was the same for all countries.
However, as historical information—especially on public investment—is not avail-
able for most of the countries under consideration, this study opts for an equal
treatment of all countries.10The results of a sensitivity analysis described in Section
IV suggest that the assumption on the initial capital stock does not affect the
dynamics of the resulting capital stock series to a great extent. Also, the importance
of the initial capital stock to the level of the capital stock series fades over time. Its
contribution to the level of the capital stock at the end of the sample is less than 10
percent for the average OECD country.
This assumption implies that investment and the capital stock grew smoothly
over the period 1860–1960, a simplification that needs to be justified, especially
since some countries in the sample experienced severe damage during World 
War II.11 The question arises as to whether the effects of war damage on the cap-
ital stock were persistent enough to affect our estimate of the initial capital stock
at the beginning of 1960. There are at least two reasons why war damage might
have had little effect by 1960. First, the countries that experienced the most war
9An exception to this general rule applies in the case of the United States. The U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) provides investment series starting in 1914. This information is used by chaining the OECD
data, which are available for 1960–2001, with the BEA growth rates for 1914–60.
10Maddison (1995) estimates gross capital stocks for six OECD countries based on investment series
that in some cases start in the 19th century. However, he acknowledges that the assembly of the investment
series is a major problem, because historical series for different periods have to be linked and because these
series rely on different weighting bases. Also, there are generally breaks in the historical investment series.
However, most important for our purpose is that historical series on investment in general do not include a
measure of government investment but only measures of private investment. An exception relates to the
influential works of Feinstein (for example, 1972), who provides investment series for the public sector in
the United Kingdom starting in 1856. However, the definition of the public sector in his studies differs con-
siderably from that underlying the OECD series.
11In his estimation of nonresidential capital stocks for six OECD countries, Maddison (1991, pp. 284–
92) assumed that the loss in capital stock caused by war damage amounted to 3 percent in the United
Kingdom, 8 percent in France, 10 percent in the Netherlands, 16 percent in Germany, and 25.7 percent in
Japan. These figures are subject to a large margin of uncertainty, though, and the war damage to productive
capacities may well have been lower. For example, Ritschl (2003, p. 414) reports that the industrial capital
stock in Germany in 1945 exceeded prewar levels by a third. This capital stock was often composed of multi-
purpose machinery and, thus, was available for civil production. Likewise, Giersch, Paqué, and Schmieding
(1992, p. 17) and Eichengreen and Ritschl (1998, p. 8) note that war damage to the capital stock in Germany
was quite limited.NEW ESTIMATES OF GOVERNMENT NET CAPITAL STOCKS
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damage grew much faster after World War II than the countries that suffered little
or no war damage.12 Thus, real GDP in countries subject to severe war damage
might well have returned to its long-run trend by 1960.13 Second, the strong rise
in GDP after World War II in these countries was accompanied by fast increases
in investment and in the capital stock.14As a consequence, the capital stock might
also have returned to its long-run trend by 1960.15All in all, there are hints that the
effects of war damage on the capital stock in countries that were most severely
affected had disappeared by 1960, the starting year for our capital stock estimates.
The strong growth performance in the quarter century following World War II
(often referred to as a “growth miracle”) was distributed unevenly among OECD
countries. As Broadberry (1988, p. 26) notes, the countries most hit by war dam-
age, such as Japan and Germany, grew much faster than countries that were hardly
affected by war damage, such as the United Kingdom and the United States. The
evidence presented in Maddison (1982, p. 55) and Eichengreen and Ritschl (1998,
p. 32) further suggests that by 1960 real GDP in OECD countries was close to the
level implied by its long-run growth path. Moreover, the analysis in Eichengreen
and Ritschl (1998, p. 8) shows that the strong growth performance in Germany
was not impaired by a lack of capital resulting from war damage. On the basis of
these considerations, we chose not to correct the capital stock estimates at the
beginning of 1960 for war damage.
The next assumption in the estimation relates to the size and the time profile of
the depreciation rate. In this study, it is assumed that the depreciation rate is time-
varying for the public capital stock and the private nonresidential capital stock and
constant for the private residential capital stock.16 This assumption allows us to
12Maddison (1987, p. 650) reports that between 1950 and 1973, real GDP grew by 9.4 percent a year
on average in Japan and by 5.9 percent in Germany, whereas the average annual growth rate was only 3 per-
cent for the United Kingdom and 3.7 percent for the United States.
13For example, long-run growth in real GDP was remarkably stable in West Germany, despite the dis-
ruptions caused by World War II. Calculations based on historical GDP figures drawn from Ritschl and
Spoerer (1997) reveal that real GDP grew by 2.9 percent a year on average between 1938 and 1960 and
by 3.1 percent between 1960 and 1990. Of course, real GDP did not grow smoothly in the first subperiod.
Real GDP in 1946 was lower than in 1938 by roughly 60 percent. However, real GDP growth over the
period 1946–60 was extremely strong, averaging almost 12 percent a year.
14Maddison (1987, p. 657) reports that between 1950 and 1973, the private capital stock on average
grew in Japan by 9.5 percent a year and in Germany by 7.2 percent. Calculations based on Luetzel (1977,
p. 66) show that the total net capital stock in Germany grew by 7.9 percent a year on average between 1950
and 1960. Calculations based on Mitchell (1975) show that net investment in Germany grew by 9.7 percent
a year on average between 1950 and 1960.
15The fall in capital stocks as a result of wartime disruptions was less pronounced than the fall in out-
put (Maddison, 1982, p. 55), implying that the gap between capital stock levels at the end of World War II
and their long-run trend was lower than was the case for output.
16This paper assumes that the time profile of the depreciation rates is the same across countries.
Official estimates of capital stocks for different countries are, in general, based on different assumptions
about depreciation rates. This is appropriate insofar as country-specific factors influence service lives.
However, only a few countries have investigated service lives with particular care, among them the United
States (OECD, 2001, p. 99). Therefore, it seems preferable to assume identical depreciation rates across
countries for the purpose of international comparisons. Such a standardized approach is also adopted by
Maddison (1995) and O’Mahony (1996).Christophe Kamps
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take into account the empirically observed pattern of aggregate depreciation
rates.17 Figure 2 shows the implicit scrapping rate for the real government net cap-
ital stock, the real private nonresidential net capital stock, and the real private res-
idential capital stock in the United States for the period 1960–2000. The implicit
scrapping rate is calculated as the quotient of depreciation in period t and the net
capital stock at the beginning of period t (data from the BEA):
Figure 2 reveals that the implicit scrapping rates differ considerably across
the three types of capital. The implicit scrapping rate is highest for private non-
residential capital and lowest for private residential capital. Whereas the scrapping
rate for private residential capital has remained roughly constant over the period
1960–2000, the scrapping rates for private nonresidential capital and government
capital have tended to rise over time. The increase is especially pronounced in the
case of the private nonresidential capital stock, its scrapping rate having risen from
about 4.5 percent in 1960 to about 9.5 percent in 2000.
Two developments may partly explain the rise in the scrapping rate. First, it
may reflect an increasing weight of assets with relatively short asset lives, and sec-
ond, it may reflect to a certain extent a shortening of asset lives. Both developments
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17National authorities usually estimate the contribution of investment to the net capital stock for a
large number of individual assets (BEA, 1999). For most of these assets, national authorities assume con-
stant depreciation rates, except for assets related to information and communication technology (ICT). At
the same time, they assume different depreciation rates for different types of assets. As the relative impor-
tance of different assets changes with time, so does the average depreciation rate. The latter will increase
over time if assets with relatively short asset lives gain in importance. This paper tries to capture this phe-
nomenon by assuming a time-varying aggregate depreciation rate.
Figure 2. Implicit Scrapping Rates for Net Capital Stocks 
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capital stock and—to a lesser extent—of the government capital stock. A similar
pattern for implicit scrapping rates can be observed for other countries. For exam-
ple, Canadian and Australian data reveal that implicit scrapping rates of private
nonresidential and government capital have also risen since the 1960s.
On the basis of this evidence, this paper makes the following assumptions
about the time profile of the depreciation rates. For the period 1860–1960, the
depreciation rate is assumed to be 2.5 percent for government assets, 4.25 percent
for private nonresidential assets, and 1.5 percent for residential assets. For the
period 1960–2001, it is assumed to increase gradually from 2.5 percent to 4 per-
cent for government assets and from 4.25 percent to 8.5 percent for private non-
residential assets,18 and to be a constant 1.5 percent for private residential assets
(see Figure 2). Equation (6) formalizes the time profile of the depreciation rates:
where δ
j
min is the depreciation rate of asset type j in 1960 and δ
j
max is its depreci-
ation rate in 2001.
Finally, the real net capital stock at the beginning of period t + 1 for invest-
ment category j can be expressed (see also BEA, 1999, p. M-5) as
Note that the capital stock at the beginning of the initial period, K1860, is set equal
to zero. Equation (7) differs from equation (4) in two respects in order to increase
the realism of the estimates. First, as discussed earlier, the equation incorporates
time-varying depreciation rates. Second, new investment is assumed to be placed
in service at midyear instead of at the end of the year as implied by equation (4).
Investment typically occurs throughout the year, not only at the end of the year.
Equation (7), in conjunction with the assumptions about the depreciation patterns,
serves to estimate net capital stocks for government assets and for private non-
residential and private residential assets.
To sum up, the application of the perpetual inventory method requires three
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18Figure 2 shows that the implicit scrapping rate calculated for BEA data sharply accelerated after
1995. To some extent, this probably reflects the growing importance of ICT assets characterized by asset
lives that are much shorter than those of other assets. Because the importance of the ICT sector is consid-
erably lower in most other industrial countries than in the United States (OECD, 2002a), we chose a flat-
ter depreciation profile for the years 1995–2001 than that implicit in U.S. data.Christophe Kamps
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case, for the beginning of 1960. This study uses artificial investment series for the
period 1860–1959 as an input for the estimation of the initial capital stock.
Second, an assumption must be made on the level and the time profile of the
depreciation rate. This paper assumes that the depreciation rate is time-varying
and different across the three types of investment considered, but the same for all
countries. Third, a depreciation method must be chosen. This study relies on geo-
metric depreciation. Section IV analyzes in detail the importance of each of these
assumptions for the resulting capital stock estimates.
III. Capital Stock Estimates for 22 OECD Countries, 1960–2001
Figure 3 displays the evolution of the ratio of the public net capital stock and GDP,
both at 1995 prices, for the 22 OECD countries over the period 1960–2001.19 The
graphs for the individual countries plot not only the author’s own estimates of the
public capital stock but also—where available—estimates from national authori-
ties and from OECD (1997). For seven countries, there is no benchmark against
which the author’s estimates could be assessed.20 The same holds for Greece, in
view of the very low capital stock estimate reported by OECD (1997) owing to a
narrow definition of public investment. For the countries for which alternative esti-
mates are available, the general picture is that in most cases the dynamics of the
author’s estimates resemble those of the alternative estimates. In some cases,
the level of the public capital–GDP ratios is also similar, but in general there
are significant differences. This, in part, reflects the fact that the initial level of
the author’s estimates depends on the artificial investment series assumed for the
period 1860–1959. Yet, there are two other reasons for the differences: (1) for
some countries, the investment series shown in Figure 1 differ sharply from each
other (Greece); and (2) many different methods are used by national authorities to
construct capital stock estimates. An attractive feature of the author’s estimates is
that they rely on the same methodology and homogenous investment data across
countries, a condition that is not satisfied for the alternative estimates.
Table 2 shows the value of the public capital–GDP ratio for three reference
years: 1980, 1990, and 2000. The average ratio for the 22 OECD countries has
declined by six percentage points over the period 1980–2000. Public capital as a
share of GDP has declined in 13 countries since the early 1980s; it has slightly
increased in 4 countries and strongly risen in Greece, Japan, Portugal, Spain, and
Switzerland. It does not come as a surprise that Greece, Portugal, and Spain are in
this group, because these countries are known to have made substantial efforts to
19A special problem in the estimation of capital stocks relates to German reunification. The OECD
investment and GDP series cover only West Germany for the period 1960–90, but they include East Germany
from 1991 on. Since there is no information on the magnitude of the East German capital stock at the begin-
ning of 1991, this paper assumes that the ratio of the East German capital stock to the West German capital
stock equaled the ratio of East German and West German GDP in 1991 (8 percent). In the estimation, the
German capital stock at the beginning of 1991 is thus increased by 8 percent for the three asset types con-
sidered. From 1991 on, this additional capital stock depreciates at the same rate as the other assets.
20Austria, France, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Switzerland.NEW ESTIMATES OF GOVERNMENT NET CAPITAL STOCKS
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Figure 3. Real Government Net Capital Stock 
in 22 OECD Countries, 1960–2001
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Sources: Series labeled “National source” are estimates from national authorities. Series labeled
“OECD FSFC” are calculated as follows: the capital stock series are taken from OECD (1997),
and divided by GDP series taken from OECD (1998). NEW ESTIMATES OF GOVERNMENT NET CAPITAL STOCKS
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improve their infrastructure after joining the European Community. Furthermore, it
is well known that during the 1990s the Japanese government repeatedly attempted
(in vain) to reinvigorate the country’s sluggish economy with the help of large
spending programs focusing on construction. According to the estimates, in 2000
Japan had by far the largest public capital–GDP ratio among the OECD countries
considered in this study, while Ireland had the lowest. The large decline in the
public capital–GDP ratio in Ireland during the 1990s mirrors the strong fall of
public investment as a share of GDP during this period. Fitz Gerald, Kearney, and
Table 2. Government Net Capital Stock in 22 OECD Countries
(As a percentage of GDP , both at 1995 prices)
1980 1990 2000
Ratio1 Rank2 Ratio1 Rank2 Ratio1 Rank2 Reliability3
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Australia 53.8 11 46.5 17 40.0 19 91.5
Austria 75.4 6 69.3 3 57.0 3 90.8
Belgium 40.2 20 45.5 18 37.9 21 94.4
Canada 41.6 19 40.0 21 38.4 20 91.5
Denmark 76.4 4 60.8 6 45.9 15 85.7
Finland 43.7 17 47.1 16 46.9 14 94.6
France 55.0 10 53.0 8 54.0 6 91.3
Germany 58.4 9 52.0 10 47.1 13 91.4
Greece 44.4 16 51.9 11 51.0 7 92.3
Iceland 48.4 13 50.5 12 50.7 8 94.8
Ireland 75.9 5 66.8 5 35.2 22 92.9
Italy 44.7 15 49.0 13 47.9 12 90.8
Japan 97.7 2 95.7 2 117.1 1 97.0
Netherlands 80.2 3 68.9 4 56.4 4 89.0
New Zealand 110.3 1 102.4 1 76.6 2 89.1
Norway 49.3 12 52.5 9 50.5 9 94.6
Portugal 27.9 22 32.0 22 43.3 16 96.2
Spain 35.8 21 40.9 19 48.0 11 95.7
Sweden 42.1 18 40.2 20 42.0 17 92.4
Switzerland 46.1 14 48.4 15 54.7 5 94.7
United Kingdom 63.9 7 48.5 14 40.3 18 86.8
United States 59.9 8 54.1 7 50.0 10 89.4
Average4 57.8 55.3 51.4 92.1
Standard deviation 20.6 17.0 17.1 3.0
Source: Author’s estimates and calculations.
1The columns labeled “Ratio” give the ratio of the government capital stock and GDP (in percent).
2The columns labeled “Rank” give the ranking of the countries according to the size of their
capital to GDP ratio; the country with the highest ratio ranks first.
3The column labeled “Reliability” gives the contribution of government investment in the period
1960–99 to the net capital stock at the beginning of 2000 (in percent). The difference between 100 per-
cent and this figure reflects the contribution of government investment in the period 1860–1959, for
which official data are not available.
4Unweighted average.Christophe Kamps
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Morgenroth (1999) state that the Irish government viewed the lack of infrastruc-
ture as one of the major impediments to growth.
The last column of Table 2 shows the contribution of government investment
in the period 1960–2000 to the government net capital stock in the year 2000. 
As explained in the previous section, assumed investment data for the period
1860–1959 are used to estimate the initial capital stock at the beginning of the year
1960. The contribution of the assumed investment data to the initial capital stock
is 100 percent, but their influence gradually fades and is quite small at the end of
the sample. The capital stock estimates for the year 2000 are largely unaffected by
the assumption on investment during the period 1860–1959, for which no data
from official sources are available. Investment from 1960 onward contributes an
average 92 percent to the net capital stock in the year 2000, implying that the aver-
age contribution of the assumed investment data is only 8 percent.21
Another way to compare the government capital stock across countries is to
look at its absolute value for each person. For an international comparison of real
capital stock, three conditions must be met (OECD, 2002c, p. 8). First, the defini-
tion of the capital stock must be the same. This condition is fulfilled, since for all
countries the investment data used in the capital stock estimations are compiled
according to the 1993 System of National Accounts. Second, the capital stock
must be expressed in the same currency; and third, the price level at which the cap-
ital stock is valued must be the same. The second and third conditions are not ful-
filled, since the capital stock estimates are expressed in national currency and
valued at the national price. These data can be converted to a common currency
and revalued at a common set of prices using so-called purchasing power parities
(PPPs). Unfortunately, PPPs for the public capital stock are not available. Instead,
we must use a proxy for this measure. The OECD (2002c) provides PPPs for GDP
and for total gross fixed capital formation. In the following paragraph, PPPs for
gross fixed capital formation are used to convert the public capital stock estimates
to U.S. dollars.22
Table 3 gives the real per capita public net capital stock expressed in 1999
PPPs for gross fixed capital formation in U.S. dollars for the years 1980, 1990, and
2000. The average capital stock for each person for the 22 OECD countries has
increased by 32.2 percent over the period 1980–2000 (that is, by 1.4 percent a
year). This growth rate has been lower than that of real GDP, implying that the
public capital–GDP ratio has declined on average during this period in the OECD,
as shown in Table 2. A comparison across countries reveals that the public capital
stock per capita is by far the highest in Japan, exceeding the average by around
180 percent in the year 2000. Regarding the ranking of the countries, the United
21The contribution of the initial capital stock varies between 14.3 percent in the case of Denmark and
3.0 percent in the case of Japan. The differences in contributions across countries are mainly caused by
differences in the level of public investment–GDP ratios over the sample period. For instance, the contri-
bution of the initial capital stock is lowest in Japan because the public investment–GDP ratio there was the
highest among the considered countries over the period 1960–2001.
22The most important qualitative results reported in the following paragraph are unaffected if PPPs for
GDP are used instead. See Kamps (2004, Table 3) for results based on PPPs for GDP.NEW ESTIMATES OF GOVERNMENT NET CAPITAL STOCKS
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States ranks considerably higher than in Table 2, whereas Greece, Portugal, and
Spain rank much lower. This discrepancy can be explained by the level of and
change in real GDP. Output growth in the United States was very fast in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s, implying a decreasing public capital–GDP ratio during the
1990s, even though public capital expanded substantially at the same time. In
Greece, Portugal, and Spain, both public capital per capita and real GDP per capita
remain low in the international comparison.23 However, public capital per capita
Table 3. Government Net Capital Stock Per Capita in 22 OECD Countries
(At 1999 PPPs in U.S. dollars)
1980 1990 2000
Country Capital1 Rank2 Capital1 Rank2 Capital1 Rank2
Australia 8,003.7 11 8,176.0 15 8,817.5 16
Austria 10,856.7 7 12,359.1 5 12,188.5 4
Belgium 5,866.2 19 8,059.0 16 8,050.2 17
Canada 8,166.6 10 9,124.8 12 10,387.4 10
Denmark 11,809.9 4 11,343.6 7 10,361.4 11
Finland 7,004.6 15 9,809.3 10 11,629.0 8
France 7,615.3 13 8,805.9 13 10,317.5 12
Germany 10,415.8 8 11,273.6 8 10,242.9 13
Greece 3,828.0 20 4,562.3 21 5,412.1 21
Iceland 8,344.7 9 10,224.3 9 11,913.5 5
Ireland 6,219.7 18 7,589.3 18 7,449.7 19
Italy 6,259.3 17 8,531.9 14 9,566.1 14
Japan 16,396.7 1 22,717.8 1 31,147.2 1
Netherlands 11,280.2 6 11,387.6 6 11,623.0 9
New Zealand 12,008.5 3 13,403.4 4 11,697.7 7
Norway 7,170.4 14 9,329.5 11 11,844.4 6
Portugal 1,909.5 22 3,001.8 22 5,254.9 22
Spain 3,320.0 21 4,891.5 20 7,334.8 20
Sweden 6,742.0 16 7,766.6 17 9,322.4 15
Switzerland 11,798.3 5 14,434.3 2 16,591.4 2
United Kingdom 7,702.0 12 7,451.6 19 7,498.1 18
United States 12,640.2 2 14,230.5 3 16,397.4 3
Average3 8,425.4 9,930.6 11,138.5
Standard deviation 3,440.8 4,115.1 5,313.1
Source: Author’s estimates and calculations.
1The columns labeled “Capital” give the level of the government net capital stock per capita at
1999 purchasing power parities (PPPs) for gross fixed capital formation in U.S. dollars. PPPs for
gross fixed capital formation in national currency per U.S. dollar are taken from OECD (2002c).
Population figures are taken from the OECD Analytical Database, Version June 2002.
2The columns labeled “Rank” give the ranking of the countries according to the level of public
capital per capita; the country with the highest level ranks first.
3Unweighted average.
23In 2000, real GDP per capita amounted to 66.3 percent of the OECD average in Greece, 72.4 per-
cent in Portugal, and 79.5 percent in Spain (OECD, 2002b, p. 339).Christophe Kamps
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has increased on average much faster in these countries than in OECD countries
over the period 1980–2000, reflecting strong efforts to enhance public infrastruc-
ture in connection with accession to the European Community.
IV. Robustness of the Public Capital Stock Estimates
The following are the key assumptions made in the construction of the public cap-
ital stock estimates: (1) investment in the period 1860–1959 is assumed to have
grown by 4 percent a year to finally reach its observed level in 1960, (2) the depre-
ciation rate is time-varying and assumed to increase gradually for all asset types
except residential assets, and (3) depreciation is assumed to be geometric. This
section assesses the effect of the first two assumptions.24 For that purpose, alter-
native public capital stock series are estimated for a reference country, the United
States, modifying in turn each of the two assumptions. These alternative estimates
are then compared with the benchmark estimates and with estimates from official
sources. The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4a shows public capital stock estimates for alternative assumptions on
the initial capital stock in 1960 for the United States, as well as the official capi-
tal stock estimate from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The benchmark
public capital stock estimate relies on the public investment series provided by the
BEA for the period 1914–60 and assumes that public investment grew by 4 per-
cent in the period 1860–1914.25 The figure also shows an estimate that relies on
the assumption that (as is assumed for all other countries) public investment in the
United States grew by 4 percent in the period 1860–1959. In addition, Figure 4
shows an estimate that differs in the way the initial capital stock is constructed.
This estimate of the initial public capital stock is constructed directly following a
“steady-state approach” (Fuente and Doménech, 2002, p. 47). It follows from
equation (2) that the growth rate of the capital stock can be expressed as
Thus, the capital stock at the beginning of period t can be calculated as invest-
ment in period t divided by the sum of the depreciation rate and the growth rate of
the capital stock in period t:
As the growth rate of the capital stock is unknown a priori, an assumption
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24See Kamps (2004, Section V) for an illustration of the influence of alternative depreciation methods
for Canadian data, based on official estimates provided by Statistics Canada.
25The official growth rates provided by the BEA for the period 1914–60 are chained with the OECD
investment series available for 1960–2001.NEW ESTIMATES OF GOVERNMENT NET CAPITAL STOCKS
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ment and capital grow at the same rate in the steady state. Thus, the growth rate of
capital can be approximated by the growth rate of investment. As it is improbable
that the U.S. economy was in a steady state in 1960, the growth rate of capital is
instead approximated by the average growth rate of investment over the period
1960–2001. This growth rate was 2.7 percent for government investment, 5.4 per-
cent for private nonresidential investment, and 2.5 percent for private residential
Figure 4. Estimates of Government Net Capital Stocks 
for the United States for Alternative Estimation Assumptions
(a) Alternative assumptions on the initial capital stock in 1960 
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investment. Finally, the investment series is filtered using a Hodrick-Prescott filter
to remove its cyclical component.
Figure 4a shows that assuming a constant 4 percent growth rate of public invest-
ment over the period 1914–59 instead of using the historical BEA investment growth
rates does not significantly affect the resulting public capital stock series. For the
period of interest, 1960–2000, the levels and dynamics of both series are almost
indistinguishable. Pronounced differences occur over the period 1940–50 only
because the public capital stock based on BEA investment takes into account the
large increase in public investment during World War II, whereas the alternative esti-
mate does not. However, the effect of this difference is short-lived. The figure also
reveals that although the level of the public capital stock estimates is lower than the
capital stock series reported by the BEA, the dynamics are very similar, as witnessed
by the strong co-movement of the growth rates of the public capital stock series.
Furthermore, formal tests for equality between the means and the variances
of the author’s estimates and the BEA series fail to reject the null hypothesis of
equality.26 Figure 4a also shows the author’s estimate of the public capital stock
relying on the steady-state approach. The time profile of this estimate differs con-
siderably from that of the other series shown in the figure. While the level of the
initial capital stock at the beginning of 1960 is higher than that of the BEA refer-
ence series, its level at the beginning of 2000 is comparable to that of the author’s
estimate and thus lower than that of the BEA series. Furthermore, the dynamics of
this estimate are significantly different from that of the other series, as can be seen
in the figure. This visual impression is confirmed by a formal test for equality
between the means and variances of the growth rates of this estimate and the BEA
series. These results suggest that the benchmark assumption on the initial capital
stock made in this paper is a reasonable way to proceed.
Figure 4b shows public capital stock estimates for alternative assumptions on
the time profile of the depreciation rate and contrasts these estimates with the BEA
estimate. The benchmark estimate assumes a time-varying depreciation rate increas-
ing from 2.5 percent to 4 percent, as explained in Section II. Figure 4b shows the
public capital stock for a depreciation rate that—based on implicit scrapping rates
for the total capital stock—gradually increases from 3 percent to 6 percent over the
period 1960–2001. It also shows the public capital stock for a depreciation rate that
is constant over time and equal to the average implicit scrapping rate empirically
observed for the United States (3.5 percent for government assets).
The figure reveals that these two estimates exhibit dynamics that differ signif-
icantly from those of the BEA series and of the benchmark estimate. The reason
is that the estimate assuming a constant depreciation rate considerably overestimates
the growth of public capital in the 1990s, whereas the estimate relying on a steeper
time profile of the depreciation rate underestimates the growth of public capital in
the 1970s and early 1980s. All in all, the benchmark assumption on the deprecia-
tion rates based on empirically observed implicit scrapping rates for the United
States seems to be the most sensible approach, given the alternatives.
26Detailed results are available upon request. These tests are carried out for the growth rates of the
series, because unit root tests indicate that the public capital stock series are nonstationary.NEW ESTIMATES OF GOVERNMENT NET CAPITAL STOCKS
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This section has shown the effect of various assumptions on public capital
stock estimates. Visual inspection and tests for equality between the benchmark
estimates and reference series reported by the BEA reveal that the benchmark esti-
mates of public capital seem quite plausible. The properties of the capital stock
estimates based on the various assumptions are further explored in the next section,
where these estimates are used as explanatory variables in regressions according
to the so-called production function approach.
V. Evidence for the Production Function Approach
This section uses alternative capital stock measures to estimate the elasticity of
output with respect to public capital, applying the production function approach.
The first subsection presents regression results for the various capital stock esti-
mates for the United States and, thus, supplements the sensitivity analysis pre-
sented in the previous section. The second subsection presents regression results
for 22 OECD countries for capital stock estimates from different sources (i.e., the
author’s benchmark estimates, estimates from national sources, and estimates from
OECD, 1997).
The production function approach is one of three main approaches that have
been employed in the empirical literature on the macroeconomic effects of public
capital. The other approaches are the cost function approach and the vector auto-
regressive (VAR) approach.27 This study concentrates on the production function
approach because it is the simplest of the three and because it remains widely
applied in the empirical literature. Even recent studies relying on the less restric-
tive VAR approach often provide additional estimates according to the production
function approach as a benchmark against which to evaluate the VAR results
(Ligthart, 2002). Thus, there is ample evidence against which the regression
results of this study can be evaluated.
The starting point of empirical applications relying on the production function
approach is an aggregate production function of the form Y = AF(L, KP), where Y
is output, L is labor input, KP is the private capital stock, and A is an index repre-
senting multifactor productivity. This expression is extended by including the pub-
lic capital stock, KG, so that the aggregate production function can be written as
Y = AF(L, KP, KG). Using the Cobb-Douglas form, the production function can be
expressed as Y = ALα(KP)β(KG)γ, where the parameters α, β, and γ can be inter-
preted as elasticities of output with respect to the factors of production. The empir-
ical literature in general investigates the production function in intensive form,
imposing constant returns to scale in private inputs, in order to avoid multi-
collinearity problems.28 Dividing both sides by KP yields the production function
27See Sturm, Kuper, and de Haan (1998) for a discussion of the three approaches and an overview of
empirical studies.
28Multicollinearity among the regressors is frequently cited as a problem in the empirical literature esti-
mating production functions and cost functions for individual countries (see the survey by Sturm, Kuper,
and de Haan, 1998). An alternative way to deal with this problem is to exploit the cross-sectional dimension
of the data and estimate panel data models instead of carrying out individual-country regressions. This is
done in the second subsection.Christophe Kamps
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in intensive form, Y/KP = A(L/KP)α(KP)α+β−1(KG)γ. Finally, imposing constant
returns to scale in private inputs (α+β=1) and taking the natural logarithm yields
the regression equation that is typically employed in empirical studies relying on
the production function approach:
where yt is the log of GDP, kP
t is the log of private capital, lt is the log of labor input,
kG
t is the log of public capital, and εt is a disturbance term. As in Aschauer (1989b),
a constant, a0, and a time trend, t, are introduced as a proxy for multifactor 
productivity.
An important issue raised by this specification is that of potential nonstation-
arity of the variables included in the regression. A large number of alternative unit
root tests are designed to discriminate between nonstationary and stationary pro-
cesses. We use the popular Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981) test to determine
whether the model variables are nonstationary. This test is applied to a total of 188
variables that are used in the individual-country regressions reported in the two
subsections.29 The test results indicate that the vast majority of variables is non-
stationary; only 13 variables appear to be stationary in level. Among the variables
that are nonstationary, many seem to be integrated of order 2 rather than of order 1,
according to the test results. Yet it is well known that unit root tests have low power
to discriminate between unit root and near unit root processes. This problem is
especially pronounced for small samples. One way to alleviate the problem is to
make use of the cross-sectional dimension of the data and apply panel unit root
tests to the variables. The results of two popular panel unit root tests suggest that
the variables are integrated to the first order.30 The individual-country regressions
are also based on this finding.
Since the variables are nonstationary, estimation of equation (10) makes sense
only if the variables are co-integrated. There are many alternative methods that can
be used to test for co-integration. In this paper, the two-step procedure initially
proposed by Engle and Granger (1987) is applied. In the first step, equation (10)
is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS); in the second step, an augmented
Dickey-Fuller test is performed on the residual sequence {ˆ εt} to determine whether
it has a unit root. The null hypothesis of the test is that the residual sequence has
a unit root or, in other words, that the variables are not co-integrated. Note that the
critical values of the Engle-Granger test are larger in absolute value than those of






t − ( )=++ − ( )++ 01 10 αγ ε ,( )
29Detailed results are available upon request. We use the so-called augmented Dickey-Fuller test,
which is asymptotically valid in the presence of serial correlation in the errors, including two additional
lags of the respective variable. The test is first carried out for the variables in levels. In this case, the test
equation includes a constant and a linear time trend. If the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected
at the 5 percent significance level, the test is also carried out for the variables in first differences. In this
case, the test equation includes a constant. If the null hypothesis of a unit root still cannot be rejected, the
test is also carried out for the variables in second differences. Small-sample critical values are derived from
MacKinnon (1991).
30We use the panel unit root tests proposed by Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) and Im, Pesaran, and Shin
(2003). Detailed results are available upon request.NEW ESTIMATES OF GOVERNMENT NET CAPITAL STOCKS
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the standard Dickey-Fuller test, because the sequence {ˆ εt} is generated from a
regression equation. The appropriate small-sample critical values can be derived
from MacKinnon (1991). If the variables are co-integrated, the OLS estimates
from regression (10) will be superconsistent. However, if the variables are not 
co-integrated, estimating equation (10) in levels might give rise to a spurious-
regression problem. Instead, it is appropriate to difference the variables in order to
induce stationarity. In this case, the regression equation takes the form
where ∆ is the first-difference operator and υt is a disturbance term.
Estimates of Public Capital Productivity 
for Alternative Capital Measures
This subsection supplements the sensitivity analysis and reports estimates of the
elasticity of output with respect to public capital for the United States, using the
various public capital stock estimates discussed in Section IV. Real GDP and
employment data are taken from the OECD Analytical Database; public and pri-
vate capital stocks are estimates calculated using the alternative assumptions on
the initial capital stock and the depreciation rate considered in Section IV. The pri-
vate capital stock is the sum of private nonresidential and private residential capi-
tal. The private capital stocks are estimated using exactly the same method as that
used to estimate government capital. The benchmark estimation assumes that the
depreciation rate increases from 4.25 percent to 8.5 percent for private nonresi-
dential assets, although it is assumed to be constant for private residential assets
(1.5 percent). Two alternatives are considered regarding the time profile of the
depreciation rate. The first alternative assumes that the depreciation rate increases
from 3 percent to 6 percent over the period 1960–2001 for all assets. The second
alternative assumes that the depreciation rate is time-invariant and—based on
average implicit scrapping rates for the United States—is equal to 6 percent for
private nonresidential capital and 1.5 percent for private residential capital.
Table 4 reports estimates of the elasticity of output with respect to public cap-
ital for the United States using the various public capital stock estimates. Figures
in bold indicate whether the elasticity is taken from the model in levels or first dif-
ferences, depending on the results of the test for co-integration. Table 4 shows that
the Engle-Granger test statistic is lower in absolute value than the 5 percent criti-
cal value in all cases. The test results, thus, suggest that there is no co-integration
among the variables and, by implication, that the production function as formal-
ized in equation (10) does not constitute a stable long-run relationship. As a con-
sequence, all estimates are based on the model in first differences.31 The estimated
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31As the usual inference procedures are inappropriate in the presence of nonspherical disturbances, the
t-statistics reported in Tables 4 and 5 are based on the Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and auto-
correlation consistent covariance estimator.Christophe Kamps
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elasticities of output with respect to public capital are statistically significant in
all cases but one and have the expected (positive) sign. The estimates are, how-
ever, very high, ranging from 0.37 to 0.85 and thus implying what Aschauer
(1995, p. 91) has called “supernormal” returns to public capital. However, this is
a common finding in the literature. For example, Sturm and de Haan (1995, p. 64)
report elasticities of output with respect to public capital of 0.67 and 0.71 for the
United States for a model estimated in first differences similar to equation (11).
The regressions reveal another problem associated with the production func-
tion approach: the difficulty of interpreting the regression results as representing
the input elasticities of output. The estimates of the coefficient on labor input are
larger than 1 in all regressions, implying a negative elasticity of output with respect
Table 4. Elasticities of Output with Respect to Public Capital 
for the United States for Alternative Capital Stock Measures1
Elasticity Cointegration Test2
Model Sample Levels Differences Test statistic
(a) United States: Alternative assumptions on the initial capital stock
Benchmark 1960–2001 0.839 0.788* −2.792
(7.144) (2.885)
Steady-state approach 1960–2001 0.878 0.850* −3.558
(5.060) (2.354)
4% growth rate3 1960–2001 0.795 0.747* −2.565
(7.681) (2.996)
BEA capital stock 1960–2001 0.991 0.830* −1.619
(6.486) (3.083)
(b) United States: Alternative assumptions on depreciation rates
3%–6% for all assets 1960–2001 0.736 0.372 −2.552
(7.162) (1.112)
Constant4 1960–2001 0.723 0.723* −3.518
(5.355) (2.672)
Source: Author’s estimates and calculations.
1t-values based on the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
covariance estimator in parentheses. *denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level. Elasticities
in the column labeled “Levels” are set in bold if the variables are co-integrated; otherwise, the elas-
ticity for the corresponding model estimated in first differences reported in the column labeled
“Differences” is set in bold.
2This paper uses the so-called augmented Engle-Granger test, performing an augmented
Dickey-Fuller test on the residuals of the model in levels (equation (10)). The MacKinnon (1991)
5 percent critical value for rejection of the null hypothesis of no co-integration is −4.795 for the
sample 1960–2001.
3The growth rate of investment in the period 1914–59 is assumed to be 4 percent a year. The
benchmark estimates, instead, rely on historical growth rates of investment reported by the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
4The depreciation rate is assumed to be constant over time. Based on the average implicit scrapping
rate over the period 1960–2000, the depreciation rate is assumed to be 3.5 percent for government cap-
ital, 6 percent for private nonresidential capital, and 1.5 percent for private residential capital.NEW ESTIMATES OF GOVERNMENT NET CAPITAL STOCKS
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to private capital.32 Taken at face value, these results suggest not only that public
capital is much more productive than private capital but also that private capital
is not productive at all. Again, such a finding is not uncommon in the literature. For
example, Sturm and de Haan (1995, p. 64) report that their estimates for the United
States imply a large negative elasticity of output with respect to private capital.
There are several reasons to be cautious in interpreting this finding: (1) the assumed
functional form of the production function may not be an appropriate description
of the data, (2) the exogeneity assumptions underlying the production function
approach may not be satisfied, and (3) the regressions may suffer from a small-
sample problem. One way to deal with this problem is to exploit the cross-sectional
dimension of the data and estimate panel data models instead of carrying out
individual-country regressions. The panel estimation reported in the next subsec-
tion yields a more plausible value for the elasticity of output with respect to private
capital.
Estimates of Public Capital Productivity for 22 OECD Countries
Table 5 reports estimates of the elasticity of output with respect to public capital
for the 22 OECD countries for equation (10) using public capital stock estimates
from three alternative sources: first, the author’s estimates; second, estimates
from national sources; and third, estimates from OECD (1997). The table reveals
the main advantage of the author’s capital stock estimates, which is that equation
(10) can be estimated for 22 countries. The alternative sources allow for only 10
and 11 individual-country regressions, respectively. The estimates of the elastic-
ity of output with respect to public capital are based on the model in first differ-
ences, as the augmented Engle-Granger test fails to reject the null hypothesis of
no co-integration in all cases. Most of the coefficients are statistically insignifi-
cant for the estimations based on data from other sources. This result is similar to
that of Ford and Poret (1991), who estimated models based on the production
function approach for 11 OECD countries using capital stock data from an ear-
lier volume of OECD (1997). In contrast, most of the coefficients stemming from
estimations based on the author’s capital stock estimates are statistically signifi-
cant. However, in those cases where the elasticity of output with respect to pub-
lic capital is significant, it is again quite large. Moreover, for some countries, the
coefficient on labor input—not reported in the table—is larger than 1, making it
difficult to interpret the estimated coefficients as parameters of a Cobb-Douglas
production function.
The last row of Table 5 reports the elasticity of output with respect to public
capital for a panel consisting of all 22 OECD countries. This estimate is based on
the pooled regression equation
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32These estimates are not reported in Table 4. Detailed results are available upon request. The coeffi-
cient of labor input is statistically significant in all cases.Christophe Kamps
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Table 5. Elasticities of Output with Respect to Public Capital for 22 OECD
Countries for Capital Stock Estimates from Different Sources1
Author’s Estimates National Source OECD (1997)
Country Sample Elasticity Sample Elasticity Sample Elasticity




Belgium 1960–2001 0.224* 1970–2000 0.471* 1970–95 0.601*
(2.477) (3.365) (3.043)
Canada 1960–2001 0.478* 1961–2001 0.396* 1970–95 0.381
(2.350) (3.594) (0.988)
Denmark 1960–2001 0.478* 1971–92 0.321
(2.894) (1.707)




Germany 1960–2001 0.028 1960–90 0.786* 1970–94 −0.311
(0.202) (4.920) (−1.341)






Italy 1960–2001 0.190 1980–2000 −0.206 1979–96 −0.375
(0.791) (−0.591) (−0.693)




New Zealand 1962–2001 −0.050 1987–97 −0.849
(−0.199) (−0.761)




Spain 1961–2001 0.388* 1980–95 −0.087
(2.088) (−0.820)




United Kingdom 1960–2001 0.175 1986–96 0.407
(1.264) (0.981)
United States 1960–2001 0.788* 1960–2000 0.830*
(2.885) (3.082)
OECD (Panel) 1960–2001 0.223*
(4.835)
Source: Author’s estimates and calculations.
1t-values based on the Newey and West (1987) covariance estimator in parentheses. *denotes sta-
tistical significance at the 5 percent level. The model is estimated in first differences in all cases,
based on the results of Engle-Granger tests for cointegration.NEW ESTIMATES OF GOVERNMENT NET CAPITAL STOCKS
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where the index i represents the countries considered. Compared with equation (11),
the pooled regression does not impose the restriction of constant returns to scale a
priori. The panel analysis, unlike the individual-country regressions, should not be
subject to multicollinearity problems, because it exploits the cross-sectional vari-
ation in the data. Another obvious advantage of the panel regression over the
individual-country regressions is the much larger number of observations: While
most individual-country regressions have 37 degrees of freedom, the panel regres-
sion has more than 800 degrees of freedom. Consequently, the parameters of inter-
est can be estimated much more precisely.
The estimation results for the panel model indicate that the elasticities of output
with respect to public capital (0.22), private capital (0.26), and labor input (0.57)
take on sensible values.33 According to these estimates, private and public capital
are roughly equally productive. Finally, based on the estimation results, it is not
possible to determine whether the production function exhibits constant returns to
scale in private inputs only or in all inputs. A test for constant returns to scale in
private inputs and a test for constant returns to scale in all inputs both fail to reject
the null hypothesis.
VI. Conclusion
This paper provides new estimates of the government net capital stock for 22 OECD
countries for the period 1960–2001. This data set has several attractive features
compared with existing alternatives. First, the same estimation approach is used
across all countries, ensuring a maximum degree of international comparability.
Second, the estimates are based on investment data (compiled by the OECD) that
are homogenous across countries. Third, these investment data have been compiled
according to the 1993 System of National Accounts, whereas the data reported in
OECD (1997) were compiled according to the old 1968 System of National
Accounts. Finally, the data set covers 22 countries and 42 years for each country
and is, thus, much larger than any existing alternative.
The public capital stock estimates reveal that public capital–GDP ratios have
tended to decline in most OECD countries since the late 1970s. The estimates fur-
ther show that a considerable disparity exists in the public capital endowment of
OECD countries, even though some convergence has taken place in the past two
decades. A sensitivity analysis regarding the main estimation assumptions suggests
that the benchmark estimates of public capital stocks are reasonable when they are
compared with estimates from official sources for the United States. Regression
results based on the production function approach indicate that the elasticity of out-
put with respect to public capital is positive and statistically significant in many
countries. This is confirmed by the results of a simple panel regression showing that
public capital is productive, on average, in OECD countries.
The capital stock data may prove useful for applied research on the macro-
economic effects of public capital in several respects. First, they may allow an
assessment of public capital productivity for countries for which such estimates
33The elasticities of output with respect to private capital and labor input are not reported in the table.
All elasticities are significant at the 5 percent level. Detailed results are available upon request.Christophe Kamps
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have not been available in the past because of a lack of public capital stock data.
Moreover, they can be used in the estimation of models based on dynamic panel
regression techniques aiming to uncover the average effect of public capital in
OECD countries. Finally, they can be employed in the estimation of VAR models—
the most commonly used framework in the recent empirical literature.
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